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The aim of this article is to provide a critical review of recent writings about jealousy in 
psychology, as seen from a philosophical perspective. At a more general level of inquiry, 
jealousy offers a useful lens through which to study generic issues concerned with the 
conceptual and moral nature of emotions, as well as the contributions that philosophers and 
social scientists can make to understanding them. Hence, considerable space is devoted to 
comparisons of psychological and philosophical approaches to emotion research in general. It 
turns out that although (Aristotle-style) arguments about the necessary conceptual features of 
jealousy qua specific emotion, do carry philosophical mileage, they may fail to cut ice with 
psychologists who tend to focus on jealousy as a broad dimension of temperament. The review 
reveals a disconcerting lack of cross-disciplinary work on jealousy: the sort of work that has 
moved the discourse on other emotions (such as gratitude) forward in recent years.  
 
















This article reviews some of the recent literature on jealousy in psychology, as seen from the 
perspective of philosophy. At a more general level of inquiry, jealousy offers a useful lens 
through which to study generic issues concerned with the conceptual and moral nature of 
emotions, as well as the contributions that philosophers and social scientists, in separation or 
in tandem, can make to understanding them. Hence, I hope that the arguments presented in 
what follows will be of interest even to those emotion enthusiasts who have not warmed to 
the study of jealousy in particular. As I provided an overview of both philosophical and social 
scientific literatures on jealousy in an earlier work (Kristjánsson 2002), I will limit my 
purview here mostly to the last decade and a half. 
It must be acknowledged at the beginning that there is no conceptual consensus 
internal to either philosophy or psychology on what jealousy really ‘is’: namely, about its 
essential conceptual contours. One commonly shared assumption – although by no means 
uncontested – is that jealousy is a ‘compound emotion’: an emotion made up a number of 
other more ‘basic’ emotions in a specific combination. I have argued that the ingredients in 
this unique compound are anger, envy and righteous indignation; but other proposed 
candidates range from fear to sadness, frustration and disappointment (see critical overviews 
in Kristjánsson 2002, 2016). Slightly more consensus seems to exist on the logical form of 
the emotion. Most theorists1 consider jealousy (in its basic episodic sense) to be an emotion 
with a quadratic structure, that is incorporating four variables: A is jealous of B because of x, 
a favour that B has received or is about to receive from C – where A (the jealous person) is 
the subject of the emotion; x (the perceived relative favouring of B over A by C) is its general 
object; B (the ‘rival’ or ‘interloper’) is its specific target; and C (A’s desired benefactor of the 
favour) is its source. Psychologists have, until recently, been preoccupied with cases where 
‘x’ denotes a favour of a romantic or sexual nature. However, attention now seems to be 
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shifting towards other forms of perceived relative disfavouring, such as sibling jealousy, 
classroom jealousy and workplace jealousy, as we see below. 
Recent studies of other emotions from an interdisciplinary perspective (see e.g. 
Gulliford, Morgan and Kristjánsson 2013) have revealed that – while at best mutually 
enriching – the work done by philosophers and psychologists on individual emotions is often 
deeply divided. At the same time, we have also learnt that research on particular emotions is 
most likely to progress when philosophers and psychologists engage one another in dialogue 
and provide grist for each other’s mills (see e.g. the recent edited volume by Carr 2016, on 
gratitude). In default of cross-disciplinary work of that kind, psychological inquiry faces the 
risk of becoming conceptually unsophisticated, with language ‘going on holiday’ (to recall 
Wittgenstein’s well known quip: 1973, §38, 232), and philosophical inquiry of becoming 
unduly abstract, at best, or utterly trivial (for any practical intents and purposes), at worst. As 
noted later, psychologists rarely cite philosophical sources on jealousy. Philosophers seldom 
take account of psychological findings on jealousy either: a trends that harks back all the way 
to Farrell’s (1980) ground-breaking conceptual work. This contrasts sharply with an 
emerging discursive tradition within philosophical emotion theory of taking empirical 
research seriously, although it must be admitted that this ‘tradition’ is so far mostly confined 
to theorists adopting a controversial neo-sentimentalist and social intuitionist position (see 
e.g. Prinz 2007). 
The aim of this article is twofold. I begin by exploring differences of philosophical 
and psychological approaches to emotion research in general, often drawing on examples 
from the recently abundant literature on gratitude which contrasts sharply with the relatively 
miniscule jealousy literature.2 The aim of this section is to offer a general philosophical 
critique of psychological accounts of emotion. More specifically, I argue that when 
philosophers and psychologists seem to disagree about conceptual methods to study 
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emotions, and about the moral standing of emotions, the concepts of emotion they are 
working with are often radically different in scope, and hence not competing. That realisation 
should be helpful in dispelling misunderstandings and, perhaps, making representatives of the 
two camps more mutually accommodating. I then turn to the second aim of the article which 
is to critique recent work on jealousy in psychology. I show how that work is informed (and, 
from a philosophical perspective, constrained) by the general assumptions that I unpacked in 
the previous section. I wrap up in the final section with some concluding remarks about 
where this inquiry has led us and what lessons can be learnt from it.  
 
Crossing or mending fences? Philosophers and psychologists on emotion 
Recent years have seen significant efforts being made to cross the traditional fences between 
philosophy and psychology in emotion research. The upsurge of (Aristotle-inspired) virtue 
ethics in moral philosophy is partly to thank, or blame, for those efforts; after all, virtue ethics 
is a naturalistic theory, which most of its spokespeople take to mean that all moral theorising 
is in principle answerable to empirical data on what actually makes people flourish or 
flounder. Some philosophers working within this theory have even started to engage in 
‘experimental philosophy’ (cf. Alfano 2016). Virtue ethical naturalism has also attracted 
considerable following among psychologists who see in it, finally, philosophy conducted by 
academics they can do business with: those who do not simply peer omnisciently down on 
the stumbling of ordinary people from thick-on-theory-thin-on-evidence ivory towers. Notice, 
for instance, the favourable stance towards virtue ethics taken by moral psychologists 
Lapsley and Narvaez (2008), although they do insist that ‘mending fences’ is still sometimes 
preferable to ‘crossing fences’.  
It would be a grave mistake to think, however, that academic fence-crossing is a more 
convenient endeavour than fence-mending or automatically more fruitful. It continues to be a 
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tall order, for example, to try to move seamlessly between literatures in the two fields (as 
witnessed e.g. by Gulliford, Morgan and Kristjánsson 2013, in the case of gratitude). Before 
exploring the recent psychological literature on jealousy, it will be instructive to consider 
some of the persisting general differences that characterise philosophical and psychological 
approaches to emotion: differences that constitute common stumbling blocks to mutual 
enrichment. Those differences then offer helpful pegs on which to hang the subsequent 
discussion.  
 When I entered the field of emotion research, I quickly encountered two stereotypes 
about relevant differences. According to the first stereotype, philosophers rely in their 
conceptual methods on the intuitions of ‘the wise’, if not simply their own armchair musings, 
whereas psychologists survey the intuitions of ‘the many’ and attempt to make specifications 
of terms social scientific all the way down to the conceptual ground. Second, while 
philosophers are obsessed with questions of normativity, concerning the moral value of 
emotions, psychologists are worried about passing normative judgements and confine 
themselves to exploring the positive or negative ‘valence’ of emotions qua felt quality.  
 As with most sweeping generalisations, however, those two do not bear close 
inspection. First, while it is true that philosophers tend be mute about their methods or refer 
annoyingly to ‘what we would say’ about an emotion – without specifying who those ‘we’ 
are, or why ‘what we would say’ should have bedrock status – psychologists are often not 
that interested in the usage or intuitions of ‘the many’ either, relying instead on dictionary 
conceptualisations or argumentum-ad-verecundiam nods to previous authorities in the field – 
if not simply on what they themselves ‘feel’ (Watkins, Woodward, Stone and Kolts 2003, 
432) about the emotion concept. Thus, when psychologists announce that they ‘will refrain 
from engaging in the theoretical battles among researchers about the definition of what 
jealousy is or is not’ (Volling, Kennedy and Jackey 2013, 388), one may suspect that, a few 
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lines later, ferocious conceptualisations will be engaged in and assumed henceforth without 
argument. Second, not all philosophers are focused primarily on the moral value of emotions; 
orthodox Kantians for example think that emotion hinders rather than facilitates moral 
judgement. Conversely, psychologists neither can avoid normativity – for the simple reason 
that a constantly value-neutral vocabulary is not available for the discussion of human affairs 
– nor are they particularly keen on doing so in practice, although they do tend to couch their 
normative judgements in terms of instrumental conduciveness to the taken-for-granted value 
of subjective well-being, or to what people generally consider valuable (see e.g. Peterson and 
Seligman 2004). All in all, then, opinions on emotion in philosophy and psychology are too 
various – and converge and diverge too unsystematically – to be adequately placed with 
references to the above stereotypes. 
It remains to consider some differences that nevertheless do exist between 
philosophical and psychological approaches to emotions. I focus on two below: conceptual-
cum-methodological and moral. One may introduce the first in a roundabout way by pointing 
out an apparent similarity between philosophical and psychological approaches: when 
discussing the value or disvalue of emotions (be it instrumental or intrinsic), both are 
typically more focused on emotions as traits or dispositions rather than episodes. However, 
the reasons for this focus are different. Philosophers typically home in on trait-forms of 
emotions because of their concerns about issues of responsibility, harking back to Aristotle’s 
well-known point that while we are jointly responsible (along with our moral educators) for 
the gradual creation of our emotion traits, we are not responsible for episodic emotions 
subsequently resulting from those traits (Aristotle 1985, 41 [1105b20–1106a7]). The reason 
why psychologists are primarily interested in the trait-forms is quite different; it is an 
implication of the predictivism which animates social science. The psychologist’s Eldorado is 
to find a new trait of personality or temperament that predicts significant life outcomes – 
6 
 
most importantly subjective well-being – beyond the predictions provided by, say, the 
ubiquitous Big-Five Model (see e.g. Hart 2013, on jealousy as a ‘dimension of temperament’, 
discussed below, and Wade and Walsh 2008, on how jealousy seems unrelated to Big-Five 
dimensions). Consequently, conceptualisations of the given emotion trait become very broad 
and inclusive – designating clustered affect profiles rather than single-track emotions – and 
measures are typically deemed adequate mostly on grounds of incremental validity (beyond 
the Big-Five, for example).3  
Consider recent psychological research into gratitude and its predictive value. Thus, 
Wood, Maltby, Stewart and Joseph (2008) conceptualise gratitude as a broad, unitary 
personality trait involving ‘a life orientation towards noticing and appreciating the positive in 
the world’. There is no concern here with identifying features that are conceptually necessary 
for ascriptions of gratitude to be fitting, nor with grounding this specification rigorously 
either in the judgements of the ‘many’ or the ‘wise’. For example, this specification seems to 
straddle the meaning of various specific emotion concepts such as appreciation, indebtedness 
and thankfulness. Philosophers may find this approach ad hoc and off-putting, but armed 
with their cluster or umbrella concept of gratitude, Wood, Froh and Geraghty (2010) have 
found effects of what they call ‘gratitude’, and of simple ‘gratitude’ interventions, whose 
incremental value in predicting subjective well-being is truly astonishing. From their practical 
perspective, this is all that matters. In response to philosophical quibbles about conceptual 
sloppiness, the psychologists may simply ask: if it turns out, say, that a presumed combined 
trait of envy-plus-jealousy is as good or better at predicting significant life outcomes than 
envy and jealousy understood separately, what would be the point of the philosophical 
hairsplitting of insisting on a strict conceptual distinction between the two?   
 Set in the context of debates about the nature of conceptual studies, the psychological 
route that I have described here is characterised by embracing the problem of heterogeneity 
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(the problem of divergent usage of the same emotion term, such as ‘jealousy’, see Fredericks, 
2012, p. 1) head-on by being as permissive as possible and focusing on broad constellations 
or profiles of meaning. Not all theorists who apply this approach are as relaxed as Wood and 
his colleagues about actual lay conceptions, but those who do enlist them often do so through 
so-called prototype analyses: asking participants to give examples of items falling under or 
being closely associated with the given concept, prioritising those in terms of centrality. 
Prototypicality of items is then gauged via the frequency with which participants have 
generated exemplars and the priority with which they have listed them (see e.g. Fehr 1988; cf. 
Morgan, Gulliford and Kristjánsson 2014). Notice that no distinction is made in prototype 
analyses between features that philosophers might consider necessary for the apt application 
of the term in question versus features that are just frequently associated with it. What we end 
up with, then, is what I called above a clustered ‘umbrella concept’ of features connected by 
Wittgensteinian family resemblances, but without any necessary common core; hence, 
prototype analyses might be more felicitously termed ‘family-resemblance analyses’.4 
In what follows, I refer to a broad concept of jealousy qua ‘dimension of 
temperament’ (Hart 2013), understood along those family-resemblance lines, as ‘broad-trait 
jealousy’, in contradistinction to the sort of jealousy that philosophers are generally interested 
in demarcating conceptually as a specific emotion and morally as a specific emotion trait (see 
e.g. Farrell 1980; Kristjánsson 2002), as indicated for example by the tentative formal 
definition of jealousy suggested at the beginning of this article. In short, then, there are three 
types of jealousy at issue in the philosophical and psychological literatures. There is the 
simple episodic form of jealousy as an occurrent ‘passion’ (‘A is jealous of B at this 
moment’); there is the narrow trait-form of this particular emotion (‘A is prone to feeling 
jealous of this B and other Bs’); and there is the broad trait-form of A being a person with a 
certain ‘temperament’ or ‘personality profile’5 which disposes A to feelings of jealousy as an 
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episodic emotion, but also to a number of other related emotions, attitudes and beliefs, which 
together may have significant predictive value with respect to salient life-outcome variables 
(‘A is of the suspicious, neurotic kind who always thinks she is going to be disfavoured by 
others, and this detracts from her life satisfaction’).  
 Because philosophers are typically interested in narrower emotion constructs than 
psychologists, what they typically do is to argue for the aptness of more specific emotion 
conceptualisations than the family-resemblance ones. They do so through what they call 
‘conceptual analysis’, a critical and revisionary process where they start by eliminating 
ordinary uses that are ‘obviously careless, imprecise, or misjudged’ (see Purshouse 2004, 
181, on such uses of ‘jealousy’) but respecting as far as possible the linguistic intuitions of 
‘insightful’ and ‘sensitive’ language users (Roberts 2003, 57; cf. 37–38). After working 
through examples and counter-examples to revise the characterisation piecemeal, the 
resulting concept, with its ragged ordinary-language edges duly trimmed, typically has a 
common core of necessary features but open-textured boundaries. Roberts’s (2004) classic 
elucidation of the necessary features of gratitude and Farrell’s on jealousy (1980) provide a 
platinum bar for analyses of this kind, whether or not we consider them to have identified the 
‘right’ conceptual features. It remains a constant challenge, however, for philosophical 
concept analysts to mediate a middle course between plodding docility before, and fanciful 
flight from, laypeople’s linguistic intuitions. It remains a challenge, also, to justify this 
method to practically minded psychologists who find the preoccupation with conceptual 
clarity and systematisation at best quirky or mildly amusing – and who often do not 
understand all the fuss about the logical serviceability of conceptualisations being more 
important than incremental validity with respect to predictions. 
 I hope this detour into different psychological and philosophical approaches to 
conceptualisations and conceptual studies will be helpful when considering recent writings 
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about the emotion of jealousy in the following section. Another salient difference needs to be 
mentioned also, relating to the ‘moral’ in ‘moral emotions’. Psychologists’ alleged shyness of 
normativity does not prevent them from analysing in some depth the moral implications of 
emotions, witness for instance the much-cited analysis by McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons 
and Larson (2001) of the positive moral nature of gratitude as a ‘moral barometer’, 
‘reinforcer’ and ‘motivator’, or the long list by Wurmser and Jarass (2008), mentioned in the 
following section, of the negative moral implications of (sexual) jealousy. There may even be 
a case for arguing that in analyses of this sort, social science shades into moral philosophy 
proper. A salutary difference remains, nevertheless, between these analyses and the ones 
typically conducted by philosophers. What psychologists typically focus on are the extrinsic 
benefits of a given broad emotion trait for pro-social ends: say, for peace, harmony and 
general well-being in society. While clearly not indifferent to such ends, philosophers – at 
least Aristotle-inspired ones – tend to be more interested in the intrinsic value of a specific 
narrow emotion trait for the individual’s moral flourishing (see e.g. Kristjánsson 2015, on 
gratitude as a moral end in itself). These different moral foci carry significant ramifications 
for the sort of conceptual inquiries that appeal to philosophers. As Purshouse correctly notes, 
in the case of jealousy, philosophers like to describe emotion concepts in ways that facilitate 
the sort of normative evaluations to which they subsequently want to subject the relevant 
emotion qua trait (2004, 181). This is one more reason why philosophers resent the depiction 
of emotions as broad-brush personality profiles, held together by family resemblances, as 
such profiles tend to be too wide and amorphous to lend themselves easily to moral 
justification (and subsequent educational promotion) as intrinsically valuable states of 
character. For example, it would be an impossible moral task to pass a collective judgement 
about the different emotions making up the Big-Five personality trait of openness, with 
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respect to whether or not they form intrinsically valuable constituents of the good life. 
Probably some do and some do not.  
 If readers have grown pessimistic at this point about the value of academic trespassing 
in the field of emotion research – given that psychologists and philosophers do not seem to be 
interested in ‘emotion’ in the same sense and hence offer conceptual accounts that are often 
not competing – let me reiterate that, from a virtue ethical point of view, there is no 
reasonable alternative to members of each camp being aware of what their counterparts are 
doing. As noted in the ‘Introduction’, without empirical evidence, emotion philosophy runs 
the risk of becoming practically trivial; without philosophical work, social science risks being 
conceptually barren (cf. Alfano 2016). The current maturity of cross-disciplinary work differs 
considerably between sub-fields, however. For instance, in gratitude studies most 
psychologists seem to be aware of Roberts’s (2004) classic conceptual analysis, and it is 
frequently cited there. In jealousy studies, on the other hand, Farrell’s (1980) trailblazing 
article – which set the standard for all subsequent philosophical work on jealousy – is rarely 
mentioned outside the charmed circle of philosophers. I consider this to be a major stumbling 
block to productive work on jealousy. At all events, it explains why there is almost no 
conceptual or substantive interplay between recent discourses on jealousy in psychology and 
philosophy, respectively. I have reviewed the sparse philosophical writings in a separate 
article (Kristjánsson 2016), however, and will leave them out of further consideration here. 
 
Recent work on jealousy in psychology 
This section falls broadly into two parts. I first chart the continuation of some major themes 
that were already in existence in psychology pre-2000 (as evidenced in my 2002 overview): 
the preoccupation with sexual and pathological jealousy; the apparent conflation in the 
literature of the fear of finding a reason for becoming jealous with jealousy proper; and the 
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(often surreptitiously) invoked assumption that jealousy demands exclusivity. I then turn to 
new and emerging themes, especially about developmental aspects of jealousy traceable back 
to early childhood. 
 Sexual and pathological jealousy. The almost exclusive emphasis on sexual and 
pathological jealousies was arguably a cramping and coarsening feature of the 20th-century 
psychological discourse (see Kristjánsson 2002, 151–157). Although not as prominent as 
before, some of that emphasis still remains, for example in Wurmser and Jarass’s 2008 edited 
volume, where the word ‘jealousy’ is simply understood as a synonym of ‘sexual jealousy’.6 
The editors’ own (2008) contribution bears the title ‘Pathological Jealousy: The Perversion of 
Love’, which may seem to indicate that they consider other, non-pathological, forms of 
jealousy to exist. However, that impression is spoiled by their favourable reference to the 
view (from a 1929 lecture by Ernest Jones) that ‘normal’ jealousy is uncommon, with 
jealousy resting ‘for the greatest part’ on an ‘abnormal and neurotic basis’ (cited in Wurmser 
and Jarass 2008, 10). The whole volume focuses on jealousy as an emotional over-reaction – 
characterised by the negative moral implications of shame, resentment, narcissism, 
helplessness, wounded self-esteem, infatuation and an inability to love (see references in 
Wurmser and Jarass 2008 to findings from the psychoanalytical literature) – and how to cope 
with it, if not (ideally) eradicate it. It would be tempting to dismiss this approach as 
conceptually inadequate, and rebuke it for turning a deaf ear to considerable psychological 
evidence which shows no correlation between jealousy on the one hand and neurosis or 
mental illness on the other (Clanton 1996). After having seen this same tendency, however, in 
explorations of other negatively felt emotions, such as shame (Kristjánsson 2014), I consider 
it more fruitful to illuminate the roots of this approach rather than repudiate it. The 
psychologists who write about jealousy in this way typically hail from a clinical background. 
Whether philosophers like it or not, pathological forms of jealousy – more often than not of 
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the sexual kind – permeate the practice of psychoanalysts and psychotherapists. The 
psychologists in question are not pursuing bad philosophy, therefore; they are simply 
engaging in a clinical ‘business-as-usual’ psychology, harking back all the way to a time 
when a distinction was made in psychopathology between ordinary ‘emotions’ and disruptive 
‘passions’ (Charland 2010). Perhaps we need a positive-psychology revolution in jealousy 
studies to buck this trend. That will be easier said than done here, however, as many so-called 
positive psychologists still labour under the illusion that a ‘positive emotion’ must be a 
‘positively felt emotion’ (for a critique, see Kristjánsson 2013), which would obviously rule 
jealousy out of reckoning. 
 Jealousy as fearful and distinct from envy. A very odd conceptualisation about the 
difference between jealousy and envy has crept into the literature at some point and still crops 
up from time to time. It states that ‘in envy we wish to obtain something that the other has 
and in jealousy we fear losing something that we already have to someone else’ (Ben-Ze’ev 
2013, 41). The motivation to distinguish between jealousy and envy is understandable. From 
a philosophical perspective, it makes for a neat and tidy specification to be able to distinguish 
between covetousness as a one-party emotion, envy as a two-party emotion and jealousy as a 
three-party one. From a psychological perspective, such a distinction helps to underpin 
hypotheses about the different empirical correlates of envy and jealousy, with envy, for 
instance, being associated with feelings of inferiority and longing, but jealousy with fear of 
loss (Parrott and Smith 1993). However, even if we acknowledge that envy and jealousy are 
not the same emotion, we are not bound to end up with the distinction that Ben-Ze’ev takes 
for granted (without argument), nor does it exclude the possibility that one emotion could 
form an element of the other. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how jealousy can fail to be 
envious; if A does not resent C’s relative favouring of B and want to take it away from B, 
then a core element in the jealousy compound is missing.7 I also find the assumed fear 
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element of jealousy puzzling. Arguably, for jealousy to be rational, A must have a reason to 
believe that B has taken, or is going to take, away C’s favouring. It is not enough that A fears 
that this may possibly happen (Kristjánsson 2002). Briefly put, fearing that you may, at a 
future point in time, find a reason to be jealous is not to experience the emotion of jealousy, 
but simply to be fearful or suspicious.  
Someone might complain that I am being too constrictive here. After all, a distinction 
between prospective deterrent shame and retrospective post-mortem shame is well entrenched 
in the shame literature (Kristjánsson 2014); should we not also, as Rydell and Bringle (2007) 
suggest, distinguish between two kinds of jealousy: suspicious and reactive? There is a stark 
disanalogy here, however. Prospective shame is still shame. It is not simply fear of doing 
something shameful in the future but, rather, shame over the very fact that one considers a 
possible shameful action as an option here and now. In contrast, so-called suspicious or 
anticipatory jealousy is not jealousy here and now but fear that some deprival of favouring 
will happen in the future that will give one a reason to experience the relevant composite of 
jealousy-forming emotions (Kristjánsson 2002, 149–150). That said, A could be suspicious 
without any good reason that C has already started to favour B; in that case, A is 
experiencing genuine jealousy, albeit irrational, not only fear of future jealousy. Notably, 
careful philosophical analyses of jealousy by people like Roberts (2003) avoid the conflation 
of fear and jealousy. Roberts talks about the favour being construed as ‘in the process of 
being lost to the rival, or as already so lost, or as about to be lost’ (2003, 257). Moreover, the 
most painful experiences of jealousy surely involve cases where there is no hope of a reversal 
of fortunes – not when one has got something that one still hopes to retain – namely cases 
where C’s favouring has been irrevocably lost over to B.  
Everything that I have said so far indicates that adding fear to jealousy simply 
involves a confusing expansion of the emotion concept. What we need to take into account 
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here, however, is the message from the preceding section: that what psychologists are 
typically interested in is not jealousy as a specific emotion or a narrow emotion trait but 
rather broad-trait jealousy qua expansive personality trait. It is highly likely that a person 
who is strongly disposed to feeling jealousy is also disposed to feeling bouts of suspicion 
about future jealousies, frequently and intensely. Conceptual accounts that exclude fear from, 
versus those that include it in, the definition of jealousy may then no longer be seen as 
competing for the same ground, as they are not about ‘jealousy’ in the same sense.  
 Possessiveness and exclusivity. An historically common (if often implicit) assumption 
in the psychological literature, whose glib endorsement still lingers on, is that the essence of 
jealousy lies in the ‘absoluteness and exclusivity of the demanded relationship’, and the fact 
that A wants to ‘take possession’ of C (Wurmser and Jarass 2008, 5, 9; cf. Ben-Ze’ev 2013, 
48). This feature, as much or more than any other, has probably been responsible for bringing 
jealousy into disrepute. Yet it is decidedly odd. In standard cases of rational jealousy, for 
example among siblings, or students in a classroom, the demand is not for exclusive or 
unequalled affection/attention. Quite the contrary, the rational child just wants to be favoured 
as much as the other siblings or the other pupils by the parent/teacher; the demand is for non-
differential treatment, not exclusivity. Assumptions about possessiveness as the essence of 
jealousy might be explained by the previously mentioned conflation of jealousy as such with 
sexual jealousy. Yet, the demand for exclusivity is not even a necessary feature of all sexual 
jealousies, for example not in open or polygamous/polyandrous relationships, where the 
rational demand is supposedly for relative rather than exclusive favouring.  
Once again, however, I may be barking up the wrong tree, for the psychologists that I 
am critiquing here may not be saying that a possessive demand for exclusivity is a salient 
feature of jealousy as a specific emotion but rather of broad-trait jealousy. If even that 
modified claim raises eyebrows among philosophers, it does well to bear in mind that when 
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profiling broad personality traits, psychologists are trading in statistical correlations that can 
be deemed significant even if they are weak. So although lots of people may exist who have a 
strong tendency for jealousy without being possessive, it could well be that the psychologists 
have a case for counting possessiveness as part of the general profile of broad-trait jealousy. 
Let us now turn to some newer developments in the psychological study of jealousy. 
.The recent Handbook of Jealousy, edited by Hart and Legerstee (2013), moves subtly but 
surely away from a number of the assumptions which have bedevilled the existing 
psychological literature, and begins to chart a new and exciting developmental territory. The 
new approach does, however, import problems of its own. Before exploring those, some 
background observations are in order. Spurred on by reductionist evolutionary considerations, 
a distinction is commonly made in the psychology of emotion between basic/primary and 
non-basic/secondary (cognitively complex) emotions. Into the former category fall emotions 
such as anger, fear, disgust and sadness, because of their universality among human beings 
(as well as arguably also among higher animals), their developmental priority, evolutionary 
functional value and unique physiological expressions.  
I share the doubts that many philosophers harbour about the adequacy of this 
distinction (see e.g. Solomon 2002). On an alternative account, basicness is more plausibly 
understood in relative rather than absolute terms, namely as relative to descriptions (basic 
‘with respect to x’), just as the so-called ‘bruteness of facts’ is (Kristjánsson 2002, 24–26, 
drawing on Anscombe 1958). For one thing, the criteria of basicness do not always align; as 
Sabini and Silver (2005) observe, there would be a case for arguing that jealousy is a basic 
emotion with respect to its evolutionary function although it does not present any unique 
physiological signs. Somewhat ironically, it is the most radical cognitive theorist, Martha 
Nussbaum – with her view that cognition is both necessary and sufficient for emotion – who 
has produced the strongest arguments for the case that higher animals and infants can, in fact, 
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experience some primitive emotions; her examples being fear, anxiety, joy and hope (2001, 
120). She does so by systematically lowering the threshold for what counts as ‘cognition’ – as 
simply the reception and processing of information without any necessary reflexive self-
awareness (2001, 23). 
In the service of parsimony – namely, in order not to dig out the argumentative moat 
further than needed for present purposes – let us grant here tentatively that some sense can be 
made of ‘basic emotions’ that do not need elaborate cognitive processes, but can still count as 
emotions rather than mere feelings because they incorporate some primitive, rudimentary 
cognitions (e.g. in infants and the great apes). This concession would normally be seen to 
have little bearing on a conceptualisation of jealousy, for the standard view is that jealousy 
does not belong to this presumed category of basic emotions at all. It does not do so because 
jealousy is a highly cognitively complex self-conscious emotion which requires the sort of 
self-referential reflection that only appears in children in the second half of the second year 
(see below). If the compound theory of jealousy as being made up of, inter alia, righteous 
indignation (a desert-based emotion) holds good (Kristjánsson 2002), the initial time for 
proper ascriptions of jealousy may even have to be moved forward, as children do not 
normally possess a concept of fairness until the third or fourth year (Kristjánsson 2006, chap. 
4).  
Even for those who believe that the jealousy compound requires sadness or 
frustration, rather than indignation, jealousy in infants and animals will be ruled out on 
theoretical grounds. Recall that according to the quadratic structure of jealousy, jealousy 
involves A’s anger at the perceived relative favouring of B over A by C. However, as Lewis 
(2013) correctly points out, such a cognition requires A to have built up a representation of 
herself as a distinct unit (‘self’) which can enter into relationships with other selves, for 
instance by becoming an object of their attention or favouring. There is ample evidence from 
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developmental psychology that self-representations and self-reflections of this kind are not 
present until a child is 15–24 months old; that is precisely when self-conscious emotions such 
as pride, shame and jealousy start to kick in. Before that time, children simply do not have the 
mental repertoire that allows them to think of themselves as discrete selves, interacting with 
other selves (cf. also Clanton 1996). 
All this received wisdom about jealousy and self-representations comes under 
sustained attack in the new Handbook in which many authors cite the same empirical 
experiments done on infants, and interpret them as clear evidence of jealousy on display. 
These experiments show infants as young as 3–6 months getting upset when their mothers 
pay exclusive attention to another child or a life-like doll but not when they simply converse 
with the (supposedly non-rivalrous) experimenter (see e.g. Legerstee, Ellenbogen, Nienhuis 
and Marsh 2013, for some of those experiments). The prevailing interpretation of those 
findings in the Handbook is that ‘the existence of the social bond […], the ability to 
participate in a social triangle, the evidence of sensitivity to social exclusion, and the 
revelation that infants develop an aversive feeling toward a rival provide a basis for the 
existence of the interpersonal jealousy system in infants during the first year of life’ 
(Legerstee, Ellenbogen, Nienhuis and Marsh 2013, 173). The main theoretical upshot is the 
claim that young infants’ potential for jealousy has been seriously underestimated by 
academics and parents alike (Draghi-Lorenz 2013). To pile on the agony for the received 
wisdom, some authors in the Handbook suggest that jealousy ascriptions should not only be 
extended to infants but also common animals, such as dogs, horses and even birds, based on 
the overwhelming majority of their owners believing that the animals can experience human 
emotions (Panksepp 2013). 
It may be easy for philosophers to laugh off the reference to jealousy in birds and 
horses as a fanciful human projection – a simple example of the anthropomorphic fallacy. 
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The infant experiments present more of a challenge. Yet I cannot help concluding that a 
misstep is committed in the interpretations of the findings by psychologists such as Draghi-
Lorenz (2013). This conclusion need not be drawn from the cloistered and condescending 
vantage point of the philosopher, but simply by drawing on the wise words of the 
psychologist Lewis (2013) who tries the best he can to defuse the situation and inject some 
modicum of sense into it. Lewis points out that similar behaviours, such as negative reactions 
to perceived social exclusion, witnessed at different developmental junctures, do not 
necessarily have to be motivated by the same processes. So the fact that the infant behaves as 
if jealous does not mean that she is really jealous. Lewis gives a much more theoretically 
parsimonious interpretation of what may be going on in those experiments, having to do with 
the child’s frustration over the loss of a goal through the withdrawal of attention. Notice that 
Lewis is not making an ad hoc move here, as he would be doing by claiming, say, that 
children cannot really feel pain – although they exhibit pain behaviours – in the absence of 
self-reflections. There is no empirical evidence for the claim that pain requires self-reflection; 
there is ample evidence from developmental psychology, however (as noted above) that self-
conscious emotions require the facility of self-representation which is not available to infants. 
Mere protest over the loss of a goal, on the other hand, does not require this facility – which 
supports Lewis’s (2013) parsimonious interpretation. 
We must realise that the interpretation of infant jealousy, which Lewis takes to task, is 
so radical that it not only involves the simple transfer of one emotion, jealousy, from the 
category of a complex, self-conscious and composite one to a primitive, simple-structured 
basic emotion – for nothing in the given literature indicates that jealousy is any less self-
conscious than we thought – but it rather requires the abandonment of the very distinction 
between self-conscious and non-self-conscious emotions as based on self-representations. 
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That seems to be too bitter a pill to swallow at the moment when there are other more 
palatable theoretical medicines available to alleviate the symptoms. 
Lewis tries the best he can to make sense of the profusions of confusion among his 
colleagues about what an emotion is and how it can be evidenced. He even suggests, 
compromisingly, that we might be seeing in these experiments a precursor form of jealousy: 
‘proto-jealousy’ (2013, 28). We could expand on that suggestion by hypothesising that this 
proto-form had some phylogenetic or ontogenetic links to jealousy proper and might even 
form part of what I have earlier called broad-trait jealousy. Notice, however, that the strategy 
applied in the first part of this section – of explaining apparently aberrant psychological 
views as not really being about jealousy as the specific emotion or emotion trait, but rather 
broad-trait jealousy – is not available here; for it is clear from a number of chapters in the 
Handbook that the authors take themselves to be making new and revolutionary claims about 
the specific emotion of jealousy, as an occurrent passion, rather than broad-trait jealousy as a 
dimension of character.  
To sum up, recent work on jealousy in psychology has provided a badly needed 
counterweight to psychology’s previous preoccupation with sexual jealousy. Sibling jealousy 
is now, for example, being explored in detail – as well as jealousy’s early developmental 
aspects and antecedents. Some of the recent literature is, however, driven by a revolutionary 
fervour whose rationale still lags considerably behind the evidence provided.  
 
Concluding remarks 
It remains a matter for some surprise and disappointment how rarely jealousy shows up on 
the academic radar in philosophical journals – even ones with cross-disciplinary aspirations 
such as the present one. I hope that my philosophical exploration of the psychological 
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discourse on jealousy has repaired some of the shameful dearth of attention given to this 
emotion. 
 Some progress has clearly been made of late in the psychological discourse on 
jealousy, especially concerning the early sculpting of broad-trait jealousy – jealousy as a 
broad trait of personality – which I have tried to distinguish carefully from jealousy as a 
unique, specific emotion or as a narrow emotion trait. The psychological literature is still, 
however, weak on conceptual analysis and overly inclined to fudge theoretical issues. Given 
that most psychologists – and even quite a few philosophers – profess to think that ordinary 
language should be the first word, if not necessarily the last, in working with naturalistic 
concepts, I would strongly encourage psychologists to conduct more studies of what people 
really mean by ‘jealousy’: both prototype analyses of broad-trait jealousy and careful vignette 
studies of specific jealousy, where respondents have a chance to distinguish it from other 
surrounding emotions such as mere envy. In addition, empirical studies of felt jealousy need 
to acquire a broader focus, to include not only sexual and sibling jealousy but also jealousy in 
the classroom and the workplace. Teacher interviews indicate, for example, that teachers 
consider irrational or immoral jealousy by colleagues a major obstacle to their work (Chen 
and Kristjánsson 2011).  
In general, what seems to be holding jealousy research back, both in psychology and 
philosophy (cf. Kristjánsson 2016) is that it typically runs on parallel tracks without mutual 
acknowledgement. Collaborations in jealousy research are not only under-developed – as one 
could argue that they still are for most individual emotions – but virtually non-existent. If this 
article inspires some emotion enthusiasts to cross the fence in question, it will not have been 






1. Among philosophers, Purshouse (2004) and Fredericks (2012) constitute notable 
exceptions, however, as they reject both the compound view of jealousy and its 
necessary quadratic structure. Moreover, as will become apparent below, many 
psychologists are not interested in jealousy in this basic, episodic sense and hence 
offer no conceptual accounts of it as such.  
2. See e.g. Panksepp’s complaint that jealousy is ‘one of the least studied emotions in 
the field of affective science’ (2013, 101). 
3. It could be argued that the reason for this interest in broad traits and their predictive 
value as ‘dimensions of temperament’ stems from the fact that most of the 
psychologists I am citing here are personality psychologists. While it is true that many 
social psychologists would baulk at this idea – and so would psychotherapists who are 
more interested in effective intervention than prediction – neither group has shown 
significant interest in understanding emotions such as gratitude or jealousy in their 
simple episodic forms. Social psychologists and sociologists are, for example, 
interested in instantiations of jealousy as social affordances of power (see e.g. Clanton 
1996), but that interest also leads them to focus on jealousy as a broad trait of 
engagement in power-infested social relations. 
4. Actually, in the case of jealousy, I could not identify any prototype study, nor a 
conceptual study based on other standard methods, such as interpretative 
phenomenological analysis, although both are commonly used for other well-known 
emotions. The most direct attempt to gauge public conceptualisations of jealousy is 
still an old set of studies by Parrott and Smith (1993). I have criticised those studies 
previously as deeply methodologically flawed (Kristjánsson 2002, 147), as the study 
design already presupposes the nature of jealousy as ‘romantic’, and a particular 
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distinction between envy and jealousy which the author take for granted – thus 
steering the findings in the direction of self-fulfilling prophecies. 
5. Similarly, Big-Five personality traits, such as neuroticism or conscientiousness, are 
not associated with any single emotion or narrow emotion trait, but rather with a 
correlated constellations of traits.  
6. I have argued elsewhere that sexual jealousy is, for various reasons, the least 
philosophically interesting and morally nuanced form of jealousy (Kristjánsson 2016). 
This is why I favour the approach taken in the Handbook of Jealousy (edited by Hart 
and Legerstee 2013), reviewed below, which foregrounds sibling and workplace 
jealousies. That said, there may be good historical reasons for considering ‘sexual 
jealousy’ the linguistic archetype of the word ‘jealousy’ (see Konstan 2006, 220, 
243). 
7. I am relying here on a simple characterisation of envy, dating back to Aristotle 
(2007), according to which envy signals A’s resentment towards B because A 
conceives B as having got, or about to get, a thing (an object or a state of affairs) 
which A wants, coupled with the desire for this something to be taken away from B so 
that it can fall to A’s lot instead. This characterisation is deliberately elliptical with 
respect to the moral rational (if any) of A’s conception. If there is no good moral 
reason for it, then A’s envy is truly malicious – and for some reason Aristotle only 
considered such cases – but if the conception is motivated by or associated with 
morally respectable concerns, the envy may well be justified (cf. La Caze 2001). 
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